India Seeks Support for NSG Membership Amid Non-Proliferation Efforts

India has underscored its support for global nuclear non-proliferation efforts while renewing its call for backing to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the 48-nation body that regulates international trade in nuclear materials and technology. The position was highlighted in a recent joint statement with a key strategic partner, which explicitly reiterated support for India’s NSG aspirations and framed export controls as instruments to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction while enabling peaceful nuclear cooperation. [2]

Context of the latest announcement

The latest articulation of India’s stance on non-proliferation and NSG membership came in the context of the annual summit-level engagement between India and Russia, which concluded with a detailed joint statement covering strategic, economic and technological cooperation. In that document, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening global non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and underlined the non-proliferation character of export control regimes, including those pertinent to nuclear materials. [2]

Within this broader framework, Russia explicitly expressed strong support for India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, calling for enhanced mutual trust in the international community to promote global peace and security. The reference to India’s NSG bid sits alongside extensive sections on civil nuclear cooperation, particularly at the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant and future sites, underlining the practical dimension of India’s integration into responsible nuclear commerce. [2]

India’s long-standing non-proliferation position

India has for decades projected itself as a state committed to the responsible use of nuclear technology, even though it is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Successive Indian governments have emphasized a policy framework built on credible minimum deterrence, a no-first-use doctrine in respect of nuclear weapons, and a stringent domestic export control system aligned with global best practices. These principles have been presented as the normative basis for India’s claim that it behaves as a de facto adherent to non-proliferation norms.

Over the years, India has voluntarily harmonized its national export control lists with those maintained by multilateral regimes such as the NSG, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement, several of which it has joined as a participating state. This alignment has involved regular updates to its domestic laws governing dual-use items and technology transfers, as well as procedural strengthening to ensure that Indian-origin materials and technologies are not diverted towards unsafeguarded or weapons-related programmes abroad.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group and its role

The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a voluntary association of nuclear supplier countries that seeks to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation by controlling exports of materials, equipment and technology that can be used to produce nuclear weapons. NSG guidelines, implemented through national legislation, require member states to apply common standards when authorizing nuclear-related exports, including assurances that nuclear items will be used only for peaceful purposes and will be subject to appropriate international safeguards.

Membership in the NSG provides participating governments with a formal role in shaping these guidelines, access to a wider pool of trusted nuclear partners and a more predictable environment for civil nuclear trade. While non-members can still engage in nuclear commerce under bilateral agreements, they do not participate in NSG decision-making processes, and their suppliers and buyers may face additional scrutiny or procedural delays when transactions are evaluated under NSG norms.

India’s NSG membership bid

India’s formal efforts to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group gained momentum following the 2008 waiver granted by the NSG that allowed civil nuclear cooperation with India despite its non-NPT status. That waiver, secured after intensive diplomatic engagement, enabled India to sign agreements with multiple partner countries for nuclear reactors, fuel supply and technology cooperation, all tied to comprehensive safeguards for civilian facilities. India has since argued that its record of compliance and transparency under this arrangement strengthens its claim to full NSG membership.

In subsequent years, India’s application for NSG membership has been supported openly by several major powers, including the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia and others, which have cited India’s strong non-proliferation credentials and its integration into the global civil nuclear framework. However, consensus within the NSG has remained elusive, largely because some member states have linked membership to NPT adherence, a condition India has consistently maintained it cannot accept, while still pledging to continue responsible nuclear conduct.

Key elements of the joint statement

The latest joint statement between India and Russia devotes a substantial section to civil nuclear cooperation and global non-proliferation efforts, creating an explicit link between practical collaboration and broader normative commitments. The two sides noted the importance of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as a significant component of their strategic partnership, referencing both current projects and plans for new areas of collaboration in high-technology applications. [2]

Within this context, the statement records that both sides reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen global efforts for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, emphasizing the non-proliferation nature of export controls and the need to balance security and commercial considerations while ensuring peaceful uses of technology. It is in this same paragraph that Russia’s strong support for India’s NSG membership is noted, situating the NSG question squarely within the shared objective of a rules-based, non-discriminatory export control system. [2]

Official articulation of India’s position

Indian officials have consistently presented NSG membership as an extension of the country’s responsible track record rather than as a departure from non-proliferation principles. In public and parliamentary forums, the government has stressed that India already adheres to the substance of NSG guidelines through its laws and its safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and that membership would only formalize a role that India in practice already plays in the global nuclear order.

India remains firmly committed to the objective of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and to ensuring that international trade in sensitive materials and technologies is governed by transparent, equitable and non-discriminatory rules that facilitate peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

This approach is framed as consistent with India’s long-standing advocacy for reformed multilateralism, in which export control regimes and other institutions reflect contemporary realities, including the role of emerging economies with advanced technological capabilities. India’s position is that its participation would strengthen, rather than dilute, the NSG’s effectiveness by bringing in an experienced nuclear power with an extensive safeguarded civilian programme.

Civil nuclear cooperation with Russia

The joint statement places particular emphasis on civil nuclear cooperation, notably around the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant in Tamil Nadu, which is being developed with Russian technical assistance. Both sides noted progress in implementing the project, including the construction of remaining power units, and agreed to adhere to timelines for supply of equipment and fuel, underlining the importance of reliable, long-term partnerships in nuclear energy. [2]

Beyond Kudankulam, the two governments recorded their intention to broaden cooperation in nuclear energy across the fuel cycle, life-cycle support and non-power applications, and to explore localization and joint manufacturing of nuclear equipment and fuel assemblies. These initiatives are linked to India’s domestic objective of significantly expanding nuclear power capacity by 2047, which requires steady access to technology, components and fuel under a stable export control environment of the kind the NSG is designed to manage. [2]

Export controls and balance of interests

The joint statement explicitly stresses that export controls should be understood as non-proliferation tools rather than instruments of technology denial or political leverage. It notes the intention of both sides to continue cooperation in this area with the aim of achieving a balance between security requirements, commercial interests and the peaceful uses of advanced technologies, including nuclear applications subject to international safeguards. [2]

This framing aligns with India’s broader argument that responsible states with effective regulatory systems should enjoy predictable access to nuclear trade, while those with poor non-proliferation records face restrictions. For India, NSG membership would be a way to contribute to shaping these norms, ensuring that they reflect objective criteria, technical assessments and a consistent approach across regions, rather than political or strategic considerations alone.

Administrative steps underpinning India’s claim

Domestically, India has put in place a comprehensive legal and institutional framework to implement stringent export controls on nuclear and dual-use items. Dedicated legislation, licensing procedures and enforcement mechanisms govern the transfer of materials, equipment and technologies that could have military applications, backed by regular coordination among foreign affairs, defence, atomic energy and revenue authorities to track and approve transactions.

In addition, India has worked to align its control lists with NSG and other regime lists, and has integrated end-use verification, end-user certification and post-shipment monitoring into its authorization processes wherever appropriate. Administrative guidance has been issued to industry to ensure compliance, and enforcement agencies have pursued violations through investigations and penalties, reinforcing the message that India will not allow its territory or institutions to be used as conduits for illicit proliferation.

International reactions and support

Over time, a growing number of countries have formally endorsed India’s NSG bid, often citing the 2008 waiver and subsequent record as evidence of New Delhi’s reliability as a nuclear partner. Russia’s latest expression of “strong support” in the summit joint statement adds to that list, signaling that a major nuclear supplier sees India’s membership as compatible with, and beneficial to, the non-proliferation objectives of the group. [2]

At the same time, NSG operates on consensus, and some members have continued to voice reservations related mainly to India’s non-signatory status to the NPT and broader questions about precedent. India’s diplomatic strategy therefore has combined technical clarifications about its safeguards and controls with political dialogue aimed at addressing concerns, while reiterating that its nuclear weapons posture is subject to clearly stated doctrines and remains separate from its safeguarded civilian programme.

Implications for India’s nuclear energy expansion

India has set ambitious targets for expanding nuclear power as part of its broader energy transition and climate commitments, viewing nuclear energy as a stable, low-emission baseload option that can complement renewables. Achieving these targets will require not only continued domestic reactor construction and fuel cycle development but also reliable international partnerships for advanced reactors, fuel supply, reprocessing technologies and safety-related innovations. [2]

NSG membership would likely facilitate this expansion by providing India and its partners with a more predictable framework for cooperation, reducing perceived risk among suppliers and investors, and simplifying the authorization of complex multi-country supply chains involved in large nuclear projects. It could also help India in its efforts to develop indigenous manufacturing capabilities for nuclear equipment, since participation in NSG rule-making would allow it to anticipate and adapt to evolving technical and regulatory standards more effectively.

Potential public and economic impact

From a public perspective, successful integration into the global nuclear trade regime can contribute to enhanced energy security, supporting long-term plans to diversify India’s energy mix and reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels. Greater access to nuclear technology and fuel under clear, stable rules can support timely completion of nuclear projects, which in turn can expand electricity supply with lower greenhouse gas emissions, especially in regions where grid stability and baseload power are critical concerns. [2]

Economically, deeper participation in the civil nuclear market could create demand for high-skill manufacturing, engineering services and specialized construction, generating employment and opportunities for Indian companies to integrate into global supply chains. As domestic capabilities mature, India could also become a supplier of nuclear components and services to other countries, provided that such trade is conducted under robust non-proliferation commitments and in alignment with NSG guidelines, whether as a member or as a closely associated partner. [2]

Administrative and regulatory challenges ahead

Even as India seeks NSG membership and expands civil nuclear cooperation, the government faces the ongoing task of strengthening regulatory oversight, safety culture and public communication about nuclear projects. Ensuring that regulatory bodies remain independent, well-resourced and technically capable is essential to maintain confidence domestically and internationally, particularly as more complex technologies and larger reactor fleets come on stream.

In parallel, India will need to continue refining export control procedures to keep pace with evolving technologies, including advanced reactors, small modular reactors, digital control systems and nuclear-related cyber-physical infrastructure. This will require regular consultation with industry, scientific institutions and international partners, as well as active engagement in multilateral technical discussions so that domestic rules remain compatible with global standards and do not inadvertently create bottlenecks or compliance ambiguities.

Next steps in India’s NSG engagement

Looking ahead, India is expected to keep NSG membership on the agenda in its bilateral and plurilateral engagements, highlighting endorsements such as Russia’s latest expression of support as evidence of growing recognition of its role in the global nuclear order. Diplomatic efforts will likely focus on building consensus among remaining skeptical NSG members, addressing specific concerns about safeguards, transparency and precedent through detailed technical briefings and confidence-building measures. [2]

At the same time, India will continue to operate within the existing framework created by the 2008 waiver and its various bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, using these arrangements to demonstrate, over time, that its participation in civil nuclear trade is fully consistent with robust non-proliferation norms. The government’s current emphasis on non-proliferation, export controls and responsible nuclear expansion suggests that India intends to position itself as a stakeholder that contributes constructively to strengthening, rather than weakening, the global nuclear governance architecture. [2]